Addressing vaccine compliance problems is of particular relevance and significance to public health. Despite resurgence of vaccine-preventable diseases and public awareness of vaccine importance, why is it so challenging to boost population vaccination coverage to desired levels especially in the wake of declining vaccine uptake? To understand this puzzling phenomenon, here we study how social imitation dynamics of vaccination can be impacted by the presence of imperfect vaccine, which only confers partial protection against the disease. Besides weighing the perceived cost of vaccination with the risk of infection, the effectiveness of vaccination is also an important factor driving vaccination decisions. We discover that there can exist multiple stable vaccination equilibria if vaccine efficacy is below a certain threshold. Furthermore, our bifurcation analysis reveals the occurrence of hysteresis loops of vaccination rate with respect to changes in the perceived vaccination cost as well as in the vaccination effectiveness. Moreover, we find that hysteresis is more likely to arise in spatial populations than in well-mixed populations, even for parameter choices that do not allow for bifurcation in the latter. Our work shows that hysteresis can appear as an unprecedented roadblock for the recovery of vaccination uptake, thereby helping explain the persistence of vaccine compliance problem.
Introduction
Mass vaccination is one of the most cost-effective means to prevention and control of infectious diseases [1] [2] [3] . Thanks to the advent of modern vaccines, millions of lives have been saved [4] . Despite these known facts about the importance of vaccine, it remains a huge challenge to achieve desirable vaccination coverage in order for herd immunity to be in effect [5] [6] [7] . Moreover, the long-standing dilemma of voluntary vaccination is exacerbated by spreading concerns about vaccine safety and efficacy [8] [9] [10] . In recent years, considerable attention has been paid to improving our understanding of the role of social factors in epidemiology [11 -17] .
In particular, the use of behaviour -disease interaction models has become an important approach to study how vaccine compliance can be influenced by a wide range of factors [18 -24] , ranging from vaccine scares [25] to disease awareness [26] . Prior work shows that a misalignment between individual interest and the population interest can cause suboptimal vaccination coverage [27] [28] [29] [30] , thereby leading to a tragedy of the commons in vaccination uptake [31] .
Moreover, vaccine may be imperfect in the sense that (i) there can exist unwanted, adverse side effects of various degrees, albeit being minor most of the time, causing exaggerated perceived risk or cost of vaccination [8, 9, 32] , and (ii) vaccination only can confer partial protection against the disease [33] [34] [35] , also known as primary and secondary vaccine failures [36] [37] [38] . Indeed, the presence of imperfect vaccine can diminish public confidence in vaccine and thus erode an individual's intention to vaccinate [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] . Although the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of vaccination has been a topic of extensive investigation [45 -52] , the complications of imperfect vaccine on uptake behaviour have not been fully understood yet [39, 40, 42, 43, 53, 54] .
Notably, in the aftermath of a sharp decline in vaccination coverage triggered by concerns regarding vaccine safety and efficacy, the recovery of vaccination rate from nadir to levels needed to attain herd immunity has been remarkably & 2019 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.
slow [39,40,55 -59] . For example, it took almost 15 years for the recovery in the uptake of whole-cell pertussis vaccine from rock bottom 30% in 1978 to 91% in 1992 in England and Wales [55] . More recently, even though resurgent measles outbreaks impose huge risks for those unvaccinated, and even in some regions like France it has become an endemic disease [57, 58] , the coverage of measles vaccination has only gradually climbed up, but still remains insufficient, more than a decade after the infamous MMR vaccination and autism controversy [40, 59] . It seems that the recovery of vaccination rate depends not just on the extent of mitigating perceived cost of vaccination and improving vaccine efficacy, but also on the past vaccination trajectory, hence possibly marring a rapid increase.
To shed light on this puzzling phenomenon, here we explicitly take into account the role of both vaccination cost and effectiveness in individual vaccination decisions. Surprisingly, we discover that hysteresis loops can arise in social imitation dynamics of vaccination behaviour. Hysteresis effect makes the vaccination coverage sensitive to changes in factors that drive vaccination decisions such as the cost and effectiveness and also hinders recovery of vaccine uptake.
Results and discussion
To quantify the risk of infection during an epidemic outbreak, we first consider an epidemiological process in well-mixed populations, using the susceptible -infected -recovered with preemptive vaccination (SIR-V) model. The infection risk, w 0 , for an unvaccinated individual is 12exp[2R 0 R(1)], and the infection risk, w 1 , for a vaccinated individual is 12exp[2(121)R 0 R(1)]. Here, R 0 is the basic reproductive ratio of the disease, 1 denotes the effectiveness of vaccination and R(1) is the final epidemic size, which is implicitly dependent on the population vaccination level, x. Assume the relative cost of vaccination to infection is c [ (0, 1). Up to a positive constant factor, the expected payoff for an unvaccinated individual is f 0 (x) ¼ 2w 0 (x) and for a vaccinated individual
The social imitation dynamics of vaccination behaviour can be described by the replicator equation [60 -62] 
which governs the time evolution of the fraction of vaccinated individuals, x, over epidemic seasons. The possible interior equilibrium x Ã can be found by solving the fixed points of F(x) ¼ 0. As shown in figure 1 , there can exist multiple interior equilibria of vaccination level, x Ã , under certain parameter combinations of c and 1. To gain further insights into understanding such bistability of equilibrium vaccination level x Ã , we find the following implicit equations that describe the dependence of x Ã on c and 1 intermediately through the final epidemic size R(1):
and
These closed-form formulae allow us to perform a thorough bifurcation analysis based on the bistability condition (figure 2). As detailed in the electronic supplementary material, we can show that for bistability to occur, R 0 and the effectiveness of vaccination 1 must satisfy the inequality
Of particular interest is the existence of a minimum lower bound for R 0 . We find R 0 must exceed e/(e 2 1) % 1.58 in order for bifurcation to occur in well-mixed populations, where e is the base of natural logarithm (cf. figure 2b,c and d,e). The social optimum of vaccination level is given by the herd immunity threshold x h ¼ (R 0 2 1)/(1R 0 ). The constraint of x h 1 leads to the upper bound of R 0 1/ (1 2 1) .
Furthermore, for given 1 satisfying the above inequality (2.4), we can derive the exact range of c [ (c l , c h ) that allows for bistability:
and where R(1) m is the largest possible epidemic size with zero vaccination coverage, given by
Taken together, the existence of bistability directs us to perform a further bifurcation analysis of vaccination equilibrium with respect to changes in the relative cost of vaccination, c, and the effectiveness of vaccination, 1. As plotted in figure  2a , the conditions of equation (2.4) divide the parameter space (1, R 0 ) into four regions, in which different vaccination dynamics can happen accordingly (figure 2b-e). Interestingly, in the region R 0 . 1/(1 2 1), despite substantially low effectiveness of vaccination, bifurcation still can occur, and full vaccination appears as a unique stable equilibrium for small relative costs of vaccination c (figure 2b). This seemingly counterintuitive result can be understood as resulting from 'the number is traded for efficiency': as the risk of infection for unvaccinated is substantially higher than that for vaccinated even in the presence of comprised vaccination effectiveness, choosing to vaccinate still leads to a better prospect of payoff than not to, thereby causing the population to be fully vaccinated in equilibrium. It is worth noting that, in spite of such elevated vaccine take-up, the effective vaccination coverage actually reduces and thus results in larger epidemic sizes (see electronic supplementary material, figure S4b).
When both conditions of equation (2.4) As revealed by our bifurcation analysis, hysteresis loops of vaccination rate can arise with respect to changes in the perceived cost of vaccination c (figure 2c). In the presence of imperfect vaccine, if the public perception exaggerates the real cost of vaccination, which should be quite small otherwise, the vaccine uptake can plunge from high levels into zero if c exceeds c h , corresponding to the descending path of the hysteresis loop. In stark contrast, the recovery of vaccination rate takes a different route, namely, the ascending path of the hysteresis loop, and is inhibited until the perceived cost of vaccination c is mitigated less than c l . Thus, the occurrence of hysteresis debilitates public health effort in promoting vaccination, as hysteresis effect simply hinders the recovery of vaccine uptake. This is an important insight arising from our present study.
Moreover, we validate our theoretical analysis of hysteresis using agent-based simulations (figure 3). For practical reasons, we consider imitation dynamics of vaccination in a finite, well-mixed population and obtain the hysteresis loops with respect to changes in c and 1 by Monte Carlo simulations (see Methods and Model section). Although our analytical results are derived for infinitely large populations, they are in good agreement with stochastic simulation results, with discrepancies owing to the finite-size effects. Similar to the hysteresis loop with respect to c for fixed 1 (figure 3a, and also figure 2c), the bifurcation and hysteresis loop can 
arise as well when varying the effectiveness of vaccination 1. We note that for the fixed relative cost of vaccination c ¼ 0.1, the equilibrium vaccination level first increases as the effectiveness of vaccination 1 reduces from 100% until reaching a plateau of full vaccination, but it plummets into zero if 1 is less than 1 l , corresponding to the descending path of the hysteresis loop (figure 3b). Moreover, in the ascending path, albeit with increasing 1 above 1 l , the zero vaccination level remains stable until 1 increases beyond another threshold 1 h (also see electronic supplementary material, figure S4a).
These two critical values of 1 illuminate the complications of imperfect vaccine on vaccination compliance. No individuals would choose to vaccinate if the vaccine efficacy has slipped below the critical threshold 1 l . Owing to the presence of hysteresis loop, the vaccination coverage cannot be immediately boosted with little improvement in 1, unless 1 . 1 h . Furthermore, overshooting of vaccination behaviour can occur as a consequence of slightly comprised vaccination effectiveness, yet such increase in vaccination coverage cannot adequately offset the loss in the efficacy of herd immunity. As a result, the final epidemic size R(1) is always monotonically increasing with decreasing 1 (see electronic supplementary material, figure S4b).
Aside from well-mixed populations, we now turn our attention to the study of vaccination dynamics in spatial populations. Individuals are situated on a square lattice with von Neumann neighbourhood. Such population structure restricts whom individuals can imitate, or be infected by, to just their immediate neighbours. Individuals' vaccination decisions and health outcomes determine their payoffs. They can revisit their vaccination choices by imitating more successful strategies among their immediate neighbours. As plotted in figure 4a,b (R 0 ¼ 1.5) , we show that hysteresis behaviour of population vaccination equilibrium is more likely to arise in spatially structured populations than in well-mixed populations, even for the parameter choices of R 0 and 1 that do not allow for bifurcation and hysteresis in the latter. Although spatial population structure can promote vaccination for small c and high 1, the vaccination equilibrium is sensitive to the increase in the perceived cost of vaccination and the reduction in the vaccination effectiveness (cf. figure 4a,b and figure 3 ). Figure 4c ,d are spatial snapshots of the population states taken, respectively, at the descending and ascending path of the hysteresis loop in figure 4a. One can see that, in comparison with figure 4d, the vaccination level in figure 4c is significantly higher along with much larger average cluster size of vaccinators, thus resulting in better population health outcomes. We also study vaccination dynamics in random network populations (reported in the electronic supplementary material), and we observe similar results as shown in figure 4 .
We also extend our basic model to investigate different scenarios of vaccine failure, namely, waning efficacy of protection from vaccination received at younger ages (so-called secondary vaccine failure; see Methods and model, and the electronic supplementary material). As in previous studies [1, 63] , we consider an age-structured population with five age classes [0 4], [5 9] , [10 14] , [15 19] and [20 75 ] (figure 5). The rates of contact within and between each age class are mediated by the mixing matrix F, thus posing heterogeneous degrees of vulnerability to disease outbreaks. Waning protection from prior vaccination in older age groups can substantially comprise the disease control effort by mass vaccination (cf. figure 5a,b) . Figure 5c ,d demonstrate that bifurcation and hysteresis of equilibrium vaccination levels can also arise in age-structured populations as a result of secondary vaccine failure.
More recently, there has been growing interest in studying behaviour -disease interactions, or more generally, the coupled human-environment systems [64] , from the lens of dynamical systems. The occurrence of hysteresis is traditionally associated with magnetic properties of materials [65] , and also has been found in biological and socio-economical systems [66, 67] . In this paper, we show that bifurcation and hysteresis can occur in the important context of public health and vaccination behaviour in particular.
Our work demonstrates that vaccination dynamics can exhibit hysteresis effect (with respect to the changes in the perceived cost of vaccination c) if the vaccine efficacy is lower than a certain threshold 1 c , as given in the inequality (2.4). Depending on the specific immunological mechanisms of vaccination, vaccine efficacy varies from highly effective such as measles vaccine to marginally effective like flu vaccine. To be concrete, for R 0 ¼ 10 comparable to measles, we obtain 1 c % 99:996%, which is higher than the current measles vaccine efficacy 95% [ effect can act as a roadblock for the recovery of measles vaccination coverage, despite resurgent measles outbreaks that impose huge infection risks for these intentionally unvaccinated. Our results also suggest that the effectiveness of vaccination has a substantial impact on vaccine uptake decisions, for example, whether to get flu shots (see figure 4b , with model parameters comparable to the case of flu vaccination). In order for the population to achieve high levels of flu vaccination, the efficacy of flu vaccine has to reach above 50%. However, such improvement of the flu vaccine efficacy may turn out difficult due to the fast pathogen mutation and adaptation [68] . The perceived cost or effectiveness of vaccination may be determined by a concurrent dynamic of social contagion that governs the changes in public perception of vaccination risk or vaccine beliefs [69] . In the electronic supplementary material, we show that incorporating co-evolving vaccine attitudes into vaccination dynamics can strengthen the hysteresis effect, further hindering the recovery of vaccine uptake.
In summary, we study how social imitation dynamics of vaccination is affected by the presence of imperfect vaccine, and discover that hysteresis effect can arise under certain conditions. We perform thorough bifurcation analysis across the model parameter space, and moreover, provide exact, closedform conditions for bifurcation and hysteresis in well-mixed populations. Extending the analysis to spatial populations, we find similar hysteresis phenomenon, which is, in fact, more likely to occur than in well-mixed populations. Our work offers a novel mechanistic explanation for the slow recovery of vaccine uptake, as hysteresis effect can appear as an unprecedented roadblock to efforts for boosting vaccination rates. Nevertheless, as vaccination dilemma is just one example of real-world human cooperation problems, well-studied mechanisms for promoting altruistic behaviour can be leveraged to overcome such hysteresis effect and thus improve vaccine compliance [16, 17, 70] .
Methods and model (a) Basic model
We model the vaccination dynamics as a two-stage game. At stage one, individuals make vaccination decisions that will determine their risk of infection during the epidemic season. Let us assume vaccination takes a relative cost 0 , c , 1 to infection. At stage two, health outcomes determine individuals' final payoffs. The risk of infection can be calculated using an epidemiological process as follows.
To 
Here, the transmission rate of the disease to an unvaccinated individual is b, compared with (1 2 1)b for a vaccinated individual. Thus the parameter 1 quantifies the effectiveness of vaccination for protecting against the disease. For perfect vaccines, 1 ¼ 1, vaccinated individuals have zero risk of infection, as analysed in previous studies [20] . For imperfect vaccines, 0 , 1 , 1, vaccinated individuals still face the risk of getting infected but with a reduced likelihood than unvaccinated individuals. Unlike previous models [10] , where vaccination provides full protection with certain probability or otherwise completely fails as if unvaccinated, in this study we assume vaccination provides partial protection for every vaccinated individual. This scenario is also known as the primary vaccine failure. In our model extensions (see details in the electronic supplementary material), we also consider secondary vaccine failure in which the waning of protection occurs over time elapsed since vaccination [36 -38] .
Individuals can revisit their vaccination decision in between epidemic seasons. Simple social learning processes can be represented by imitation dynamics under peer influence, through which process individuals try to learn vaccination strategies that are more successful (i.e. higher payoffs). Following common practice in prior work [14] , we use the replicator dynamics to account for such social imitation of vaccination dynamics. Let x denote the fraction of vaccinated individuals in the population. The evolutionary dynamics of vaccination behaviour can be described by the following differential equation (the appropriate time scales will be seasons):
Here, F(x) denotes the payoff difference between a vaccinated and unvaccinated individual. Investigation of possible fixed points of F(x) tells us about the interior equilibrium (mixed) of vaccination level x Ã and their evolutionarily stability.
(b) Simulation methods
In our stochastic agent-based simulations, we simulate the epidemic spreading process that determines the health outcomes of individuals using the Gillespie algorithm [71] . In the stage of updating vaccination strategy, a focal individual [5, 9] age class [10, 14] age class [15, 19] age class [20, 75] perfect protection age class [0, 4] age class [5, 9] age class [10, 14] age class [15, 19] age class [20, 75] relative cost of vaccination, c i randomly picks up one neighbour individual j, and adopts j's vaccination strategy s j with the probability given by 
Here, we choose D max to be 1 þ c. This updating rule has been called as the 'replicator dynamic' [72] . In the limit of infinitely large populations, the stochastic dynamics are shown to converge to the deterministic replicator equation, up to a constant factor [73] . We perform similar stochastic simulations in lattice populations with the von Neumann neighbourhood [74, 75] . In this case, individuals can only be infected by, or imitate from, immediate neighbours.
To determine equilibrium vaccination levels, we run each simulation with specified initial conditions first for 3000 steps and then average the vaccination level over steps from 3000 to 4000. We further average this over 50-100 independent runs. Our results are robust with respect to changes in simulation steps. To obtain the hysteresis loop by simulations, we start the simulation with increasing costs of vaccination c i specified by the sequence 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , . . . , 1 (with decreasing effectiveness of vaccination 1 . 1 1 . 1 2 . 1 3 . . . . . 0, respectively). For each parameter choice, we obtain the equilibrium vaccination as mentioned above and use this equilibrium at c i (1 i ) as the initial condition for the next run with the parameter value c iþ1 (1 iþ1 ), and subsequently obtain the equilibrium value under this new parameter value, and so on. In this way, we obtain the descending path of the hysteresis loop. For the ascending path, we just do the same but reverse the sequence order in varying the parameters. By simulating different population sizes, we confirm that no pronounced effect is observed in the simulation results, including the width of the hysteresis loop (i.e. the parameter range over which the hysteresis occurs), due to the specific lattice size used in figure 4 .
If the population enters absorbing states due to finite population size effects, we need to perturb the system into a mixed population state as the prescribed initial input for the subsequent simulation runs. Specifically, we use the frequency of 95% vaccinated as the initial condition for the next parameter run if the population enters full vaccination in the previous parameter run, and similarly we use 5% vaccinated as the initial condition if the population enters zero vaccination in the previous parameter run. We confirm that small variations with respect to choices of these initial conditions do not qualitatively change our simulation results.
(c) Model extensions
To study secondary vaccine failure, we extend the basic model with an age structure that depicts different mixing contacts and therefore heterogeneous risks of infection among n age classes. For simplicity, we suppose that a fraction x of each age cohort is vaccinated, essentially at birth. This assumption is appropriate for studying childhood diseases, as most types of childhood immunization are scheduled more or less within 12 months of birth. As detailed in the electronic supplementary material, the age-structured epidemiological model is similar to equation (3.1), except for using age-specific parameters, which are given by the vector of transmission ratesb ¼ [b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n ], recovery ratesĝ ¼ [g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g n ], and vaccine efficacieŝ 1 ¼ [1 1 , 1 2 , . . . , 1 n ], for each age class a ¼ 1, 2, . . ., n, respectively. The parameter 1 a quantifies the degree of waning of vaccine protection for individuals in age class a who had received vaccination shortly after birth. Denote the population proportion of each age class byâ ¼ [a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ]. The force of infection for the age class a is b a ( P n j¼1 f aj I j ), where the elements f aj of the mixing matrix F mediate the rates of contact between and within age classes. The overall risks of infection for vaccinated versus unvaccinated across age classes determine vaccine uptake decisions.
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